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In Race and Representation Revisited: The New Racial Gerrymandering Cases and Section 2 of the VRA, Guy-Uriel Charles and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer explore the Voting Rights Act in a novel way.
2 They focus on the aspects of the Act that, from the beginning, made it vulnerable to "exit," and eventually led to the "judicially enforced exit" that manifested in Shelby County v. Holder. 3 This theme of cross-branch exit appears in many of the other contributions to this symposium, from Curt Bradley's focus on executive-led exit from treaties 4 to Jim Salzman and J.B. Ruhl's exploration of "presidential exit" not only from prior presidential actions, but from statutory commitments. 5 We approach the theme of exit from the other direction: limitations on exit, especially those that are tied to voting and † Lanty L. Smith '67 Professor of Law, Duke Law School; Professor of Law, Duke Law School.
1 6 The evils that the VRA was designed to address seem mild in comparison to the situation on the island, where people cannot vote at all in Presidential elections. 7 Perhaps to the surprise of many Americans on the mainland, though, Puerto Ricans are American citizens, and have been for more than a century. The precise incidents of that citizenship are still, even a century later, murky.
8 But it is undeniable that Puerto Ricans have some kind of status in the American legal system that they did not have when the island was originally acquired in the 1800s.
As for the island itself, its legal status is also dubious. Indeed, many scholars have noted the ways in which the island's second-class status lays a foundation for the second-class citizenship of its residents.
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Puerto Rico is not a state, but it is not a foreign country. It is, in the words of the Supreme Court, "foreign in a domestic sense" 10 -a socalled "unincorporated territory." That classification has implications not only for the past and present treatment of the island, but also for its future.
Perhaps most ominously, prominent scholars have suggested that Puerto Rico's status leaves open the possibility that the island might be "de-annexed"-expelled-from the remainder of the United States. The question motivating this paper is different, but builds on the expulsion possibility, considering it in light of the connection between citizenship and the island's status. We ask: What happens to citizenship rights if Congress decides it is time to give Puerto Rico "independence" against its will? More broadly, we are probing the tension between a strong individual right (citizenship) and a potentially weak collective right (the right of Puerto Rico to remain part of the United States, which is arguably revocable by Congress on a whim).
14 We argue that the strong citizenship rights enjoyed by Puerto Ricans today-granted by statute, and solidified by nearly a century of historical practice-are not compatible with an unrestrained power of Congress to expel the island.
The next natural question is which of the two propositions must give way: Do Puerto Ricans lose whatever citizenship rights they have, or does Congress lose whatever expulsion power it has? We argue that Puerto Rican citizenship effectively trumps, in legal and practical terms, any congressional power of expulsion.
If we are right, there could be significant implications, in particular for the continuing viability of the Insular Cases-the Supreme Court decisions that created the category of "unincorporated territory" and relegated Puerto Rico to it. In effect, Puerto Rican citizenship provides strong evidence that, to quote language from later Supreme Court cases, "over time the ties between the United States and any of its unincorporated territories" have "strengthen [ed] in ways that are of constitutional significance." 14. This tension between individual and collective rights has, of course, been recognized and explored elsewhere. Rico's current status, it is helpful to know how the two features began, and how they are related. Puerto Rican citizenship has been disadvantaged ever since the island was acquired by the United States following the SpanishAmerican War. The United States had acquired inhabited territories by treaty in the past-the Louisiana Purchase being the most obvious example-and had always made provision for the citizenship of the people and the eventual statehood of the area. 16 That was not the case for Puerto Rico. Although Puerto Ricans had been entitled to some citizenship rights under the Spanish, 17 Article IX of the Treaty of Paris took away those rights without correspondingly guaranteeing U.S. citizenship. Instead, Congress was given power to "determine[]" their "civil rights and political status." 18 From the outset, then, the legal status of the island and its inhabitants was unclear. That limbo, and a political moment that focused attention on the question of American empire, generated an incredible outpouring of public discussion 19 and legal scholarship.
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It also generated legislation. The citizenship limbo permitted by the Treaty of Paris and established by the Foraker Act would later be echoed by the Supreme Court in the Insular Cases, which confronted the question of the island's legal status vis-à-vis the United States. That question has been addressed elsewhere, and-despite general neglect in the legal academy-fortunately has attracted increasing attention in recent years. 24 The Court's answer was, to put it mildly, not entirely satisfactory. In brief, the Justices concluded that Puerto Rico was an "unincorporated territory"-a novel category with an odd relationship to the mainland. U.S. territories, of course, had existed before, and all of them had eventually been made into states. But unincorporated territories lacked that constitutional trajectory, leaving serious questions about what they can demand or reject.
Most relevantly for this symposium's theme of "exit," eminent jurists have found evidence suggesting that the Insular Cases were written to preserve the United States' option to expel Puerto Rico. These statutes and Supreme Court decisions put the island, as a political entity, and its people, as political actors, in limbo. Individual citizenship and territorial status were both sorted into novel and, within our legal system, unique categories. But they were also linked in law and practice, even though, technically speaking, they need not be 23 As a matter of US law and practice, citizenship and territorial status are deeply intertwined, as political leaders in Puerto Rico have long recognized. Even in 1916, Puerto Rico's resident commissioner, Luis Muñoz Rivera, spoke for many when he said: "Give us statehood and your glorious citizenship will be welcome to us and to our children. If you deny us statehood, we decline your citizenship, frankly, proudly, as befits a people who … will preserve their conception of honor, which none can take from them . . . ." 31 That independence can be explained in part by the fact that the Filipinos fought hard for it. 32 But it might also have to do with the fact that the territory had become expensive for the mainland, especially as more and more relatively poor Filipinos migrated to the US mainland. 33 And that, in turn, may help explain why, in addition to independence for the Philippines, the relevant treaty also stripped Filipinos of their nationality. 34 Back then, we imagine no one blinked an eyelid at the fact that the hypothetical John Paulsons from New York, who happened to be living in Manila at the time, would get to retain their US citizenship.
As for Puerto Rico, the deal proposed by Rivera and other political leaders-citizenship only with statehood to accompany itwas effectively declined. In 1917, another Jones Act conferred American citizenship on Puerto Ricans. 35 But as Cabranes notes, "the citizenship that was granted was not complete," and the "very word 'citizenship' suggested equality of rights and privileges and full membership in the American political community, thereby obscuring the colonial relationship between a great metropolitan state and a poor overseas dependency." 36 Cabranes concludes that "[b]y extending United States citizenship to the Puerto Ricans after promising independence to the Filipinos, Congress intended to do little more than proclaim the permanence of Puerto Rico's political links with the United States." 37 Some, however, interpreted the signals differently, and thought that statehood would follow citizenship. As a former governor of Puerto Rico put it, an "implied pledge of statehood [was] made to Puerto Ricans when citizenship was granted." 38 He was not alone. It was "widely believed that it would only be a matter of time until this 'transitory phase' would end in statehood." 39 Has that time finally come?
II. IS PUERTO RICAN CITIZENSHIP CONSISTENT WITH A CONGRESSIONAL POWER OF EXPULSION?
The Territories Clause undoubtedly gives Congress great power over the territories. When it comes to uninhabited territories, that power might well include the power to cede or transfer. But that does not necessarily mean that Puerto Rico-inhabited by millions of US citizens-is subject to the same plenary power. 40 When an enumerated congressional power runs into a rights-based limitation, it must yield. 41 And it follows that if Puerto Rican citizenship (a right) is inconsistent with the power to expel (a power), then the latter gives way.
To take one example, we think it clear that the Equal Protection Clause would prevent Congress from expelling Puerto Rico from the United States because of racially discriminatory animus and with the goal of harming the overwhelmingly Hispanic citizens of the island. Racial animus directed at American citizens is the bête noir of Equal Protection, after all. 42 The same would of course be true of any effort to strip them of citizenship on that basis. (For that reason, among others, we suspect that the US treatment of the Filipinos' nationality in the wake of the Philippines independence would not pass constitutional muster today.)
One might take the fallback position that Puerto Rican citizenship is simply a matter of statutory grace (if it is a constitutional imperative then the answers are even more clear 43 the problem, since the citizenship statutes themselves were infected with racial bias. 44 The Supreme Court in Downes v. Bidwell suggested as much: "Indeed, it is doubtful if Congress would ever assent to annexation of territory upon the condition that its inhabitants, however foreign they may be to our habits, traditions and modes of life, shall become at once citizens of the United States." 45 Of course, Downes says "at once," and the argument is not that Puerto Ricans became citizens at the moment the island was annexed. The argument, instead, is that the citizenship that has been given may not so simply be taken away. Perhaps for this very reason, discussions of Puerto Rican citizenship in the wake of severance typically consider the possibility that Puerto Ricans would have the option to retain their US citizenship-to become, in effect, an island of ex-patriates. Contemplating the end of US sovereignty and citizenship in Puerto Rico, Dick Thornburgh-the former Attorney General and Republican politician who has consistently supported selfdetermination for the island 46 -concludes: History and U.S. law show that U.S. citizenship will end in one of two ways. When the independent nation of the Philippines succeeded the Philippines commonwealth, U.S. nationality and territorial citizenship for persons who acquired it based on birth in the territory ended and all persons so situated became aliens under U.S. law. Those residing in the United States were repatriated to their homeland in the new republic of the Philippines, except for those who met residency requirements in the states of the Union and thereby were permitted by Congress to become candidates for naturalization. The other option, exemplified by in the case of the succession from Spanish to U.S. sovereignty, provides for an election of allegiance to be allowed, requiring a choice of nationalities but not allowing dual nationality to be created by U.S. law or as part of the succession process. 47 Would the second of these options-which seems to be the overwhelming preference-solve all of the problems described here? As far as citizenship is concerned, it would. But that simply reinforces the conclusion that citizenship is non-negotiable.
In Balzac v. Porto Rico, the Court effectively tried to draw a distinction between territory and citizenship, holding that the 1917 grant of citizenship to the island's inhabitants did not change their constitutional rights, so long as they remained residents of the island. 48 Chief Justice Taft concluded that the locality, and not their individual status as citizens, was what mattered. 49 And he suggested that moving Puerto Rico out of unincorporated territory status would take something like an explicit act of Congress. But is that still true?
III. DE FACTO INCORPORATION
There is reason to think that the latter point from Balzac is no longer good law. After all, the Supreme Court has held "[i]t may well be that over time the ties between the United States and any of its unincorporated Territories strengthen in ways that are of constitutional significance." 50 One federal district court has even held that Puerto Rico has now become an incorporated territory. 51 We believe that Puerto Rican citizenship, and the corresponding limitation on Congress's power to expel the island, is part of that story.
Recall that, on one predominant reading, the category of "unincorporated territories" was created precisely so as to preserve Congress's power to expel those territories. What differentiates them from incorporated territories, then, is that they are subject to such a power. If Puerto Rico is an unincorporated territory because it can be expelled, then if it cannot be expelled it is not an unincorporated territory. As we have shown, Puerto Rican citizenship means that the island cannot be expelled. It follows that Puerto Rico cannot be an unincorporated territory.
This would not mean that Puerto Rico should immediately become a state. Instead, it would become an incorporated territory-a step out of limbo, and toward either statehood or independence. (Nov. 10, 2008 ) ("Although Congress has never enacted any affirmative language such as 'Puerto Rico is hereby an incorporated territory,' its sequence of legislative actions from 1900 to present has in fact incorporated the territory.").
